## Surfing the waves of explanation



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## The goal of explainable AI



## Wikipedia:

Explainable Al (XAI) refers to methods and techniques in the application of artificial intelligence technology (Al) such that the results of the solution can be understood by human experts.

[^0]
## Explanations: a social science perspective

It is important to realise that [Miller, 2019]:
(1) explanations are contrastive: "why P instead of Q?"
(2) explanations are selected (in a biased manner): people include just one or two relevant causes as explanation; this selection is influenced by cognitive biases.
3 explanations do not refer to probabilities or statistical relationships; the most likely explanation is not always the best explanation.
4 explanations are social: presented as part of a conversation or interaction.

Miller [2019]:
For over two decades, cognitive psychologists and scientists have investigated how people generate explanations and how they evaluate their quality.

When did AI start generating and evaluating explanations?

## XAI output past decade



## Waves of AI output



Al: https://www.finextra.com/the-long-read/62/
what-should-be-taken-into-account-if-artificial-intelligence-is-to-be-regulated

## Waves of AI and XAI output



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## Bayesian network (BN)

- late 1980s: introduced by J. Pearl;
- model $\mathcal{B}$ of discrete joint probability distribution $P(\boldsymbol{V})$;
- qualitative part: intuitive (?) DAG $G$ of independence relation;
- quantitative part: distributions $P\left(V_{i} \mid p a_{G}\left(V_{i}\right)\right)$;


$$
\begin{array}{lll}
P(b \mid m c)=0.20 & P(m c)= & 0.20 \\
P(b \mid \neg m c)=0.05 & & 0.80 \\
& P(c \mid b \wedge i s c)= & 0.80 \\
P(s h \mid b)=0.80 & P(c \mid \neg b \wedge i s c)= & 0.80 \\
P(s h \mid \neg b)=0.60 & P(c \mid b \wedge \neg i s c)= & 0.80 \\
& P(c \mid \neg b \wedge \neg i s c)=0.02 \\
P(c t \mid b)= & 0.95 & \\
P(c t \mid \neg b)=0.10 & P(i s c \mid m c)= & 0.80 \\
& P(i s c \mid \neg m c)= & 0.20
\end{array}
$$

- can be handcrafted or learned from data;
- $P(\boldsymbol{V})=\prod_{i=1}^{n} P\left(V_{i} \mid p a_{G}\left(V_{i}\right)\right)$


## Reasoning in Bayesian networks: queries

Let $\boldsymbol{V}=\boldsymbol{H} \cup \boldsymbol{I} \cup \boldsymbol{E}$ be composed of three disjoint subsets.
Typical queries posed to a BN are:
MAP/MPE: $\arg \max _{\boldsymbol{h}} P(\boldsymbol{H}=\boldsymbol{h} \mid \boldsymbol{E}=\boldsymbol{e})$
(classification)
Inference: $P(\boldsymbol{H}=\boldsymbol{h} \mid \boldsymbol{E}=\boldsymbol{e})$
(What if?)
(typically $H$ is a single $V_{i}$ )
where $e$ and $h$ denote value assignments to $\boldsymbol{E}, \boldsymbol{H}$.

## Explaining Bayesian networks

- 1992: Explanation in Bayesian belief networks (Stanford PhD thesis by H.J. Suermondt)
- 2001: A Review of Explanation Methods for Bayesian Networks (KER paper by C. Lacave and F.J. Díez)


[^1]
## Explanation of the model: graph and visual priors



BN: The Native Fish Bayesian networks (A. Nicholson, O. Woodberry, Ch. Twardy, Bayesian Intelligence Tech.Rep. 2010)

## Beware of the DAG!

- DAG suggests causal interpretation;
- DAGs in the same Markov equivalence class represent the same probabilistic independences

$\Longrightarrow B N s$ with different graphs and different 'causal' interpretation can represent same $P(\boldsymbol{V})$ !


## Causal anecdote



BNs: Bayesian network models for the management of ventilator-associated pneumonia (S. Visscher, PhD Thesis, UU, 2008)

## Intermezzo: general overview of my research



## Analysis for explaining decisions

Derks \& De Waal (2021):
Explanation of decisions supports the following questions:

- "Given the available information, are we ready to make a decision?", and if not
- "What additional information do we require to make an informed decision?"
using threshold-based solutions:
- SDP: probability that same decision is made upon obtaining additional evidence
- sensitivity analysis: to what extent does the outcome depend on the specified conditional probabilities?


## Construction: using monotonicity \& idioms

QPNs, ~1990 -

idioms, ~2000 -


QPN: Qualitative approaches to quantifying probabilistic networks (S. Renooij, PhD Thesis, UU, 2001) Narrative idiom: When stories and numbers meet in court (C.S. Vlek, PhD Thesis, RUG, 2016)

## Construction: probability elicitation

Eliciting $P($ Conjunctivitis $=$ yes $\mid$ Mucositis $=$ no $)$ :


Scale: Qualitative approaches to quantifying probabilistic networks (S. Renooij, PhD Thesis, UU, 2001)

## Explanation of reasoning: monotonicity (visual)



Img: Explanation of Bayesian Networks and Influence Diagrams in Elvira (C. Lacave, M. Luque, F.J. Díez, IEEE Trans., 2007)

## Explanation of reasoning: scenarios (textual)

## 1991:

```
The following scenario(s) are
compatible with cold:
A. Cold and no cat hence no
    allergy 0.47
    Other less probable
    scenario(s) 0.06
The following scenario(s) are
incompatible with cold:
B. No Cold and cat causing
    allergy0.48
Scenario A is about as likely as
scenario B (0.47/0.48)
because cold in A is a great deal
less likely than no cold in B
(0.08/0.92),
although no cat in A is a great deal
more likely than cat in B (0.9/0.1).
Therefore cold is slightly more likely than not ( \(\mathrm{p}=0.52\) ).
```


## 2016:

Scenario 2: Sylvia and Tom committed the burglary. (prior probability: 0.0001 , posterior probability: 0.2326 )

Scenario: Sylvia and Tom committed the burglary: Sylvia and Tom had debts and a window was already broken. Then, Sylvia and Tom climbed through the window. Then, Tom stole a laptop.

Scenario 2 is complete and consistent. It contains the evidential gap 'Sylvia and Tom had debts' and the supported implausible element 'A window was already broken'.
Evidence for and against scenario 2:

* Broken window: moderate evidence to support scenario 2.
* Statement: Tom sold laptop: moderate evidence to support scenario 2.
* Testimony: window was already broken: weak evidence to support scenario 2.
* All evidence combined: very strong evidence to support scenario 2.

1991: Qualitative propagation and scenario-based approaches to explanation of probabilistic reasoning (M. Henrion, M.J. Druzdzel, UAI)
2016: When stories and numbers meet in court (C.S. Vlek, PhD Thesis, RUG)

## Explanation of reasoning: relevance of evidence

## 2015:

## 1997:

```
Before presentingrarrevidence, the probability of GALLSTONBS
being present is 0.128
The following pieces of evidence are considered important (in
order of importance):
- Presence of GUARDING results in a posterior probability of 0.175 for GALLSTONES .
- AGE of 41 reaults in a posterior probability of 0.172 for GALLSTONES.
Their influence flows along the following paths:
- GUARDING is caused by CHOLECYSTITIS, which is caused by GALLSTONES.
- AGE influences GALLSTONES
Presentation of the evidence results in a posterior probability of 0.227 for the presence of GALLSTONES.
```

The value scirrheus of node Shape is certain ( $\mathrm{P}=1.00$ ),
We were able to construct four arguments based on the evidence associated with the value scirrheus for node Shape ( $\mathbf{S}$ ) The arguments are ordered by how influential they are tor the value of the node Shape ( $\mathbf{S}$

- Argument 1: Node Endosono-mediast has value no

Node Bronchoscopy has value no
Node Lapa-diagragm has value no Node CT-organs has value none Node X-fistula has value no Node CT-liver has value no Node X-lungs has value no Node CT-lungs has value no Node Endosono-wall has value T3

- Argument 2 Node Gastro-shape has value scirrheus Node Gastro-circumf has value circulair Node Gastro-length has value $5<=x<10$ Node Weightloss has value $x<10 \%$ Node Endosono-wall has value T3 Node Endosono-truncus has value non-determ Node Endosono-loco has value yes Node Gastro-necrosis has value no Node X-fistula has value no
Node Endosono-mediast has value no Node Gastro-location has value distal
- Argument 3 : Node Gastro-shape has value scirrheus

Argument 4 Node $X$-fistula has value no
Node Gastro-necrosis has value no


1997: BANTER: a Bayesian network tutoring shell (P. Haddawy, J. Jacobson, Ch.E. Kahn Jr., Al in Med.)
2015: Explaining the reasoning of Bayesian networks with intermediate nodes and clusters (J. van Leersum, MSc Thesis, UU)

## Explanation of reasoning: argument graphs



2011: On extracting arguments from Bayesian network representations of evidential reasoning (J. Keppens, ICAIL) 2017: Designing and understanding forensic Bayesian networks using argumentation (S.T. Timmer, PhD Thesis, UU)

## Persuasive contrastive explanation (explanation of reasoning: classification)

Consider evidence e $\in \Omega(\boldsymbol{E})$, resulting in output $t$ instead of $t^{\prime}$.
A persuasive contrastive explanation combines

- sufficient explanation s
- minimal sub-configuration of evidence e that suffices for concluding $t$, regardless of the values for $\boldsymbol{E} \backslash \boldsymbol{S}$
" evidence s would already be enough to conclude $t$ "
- counterfactual explanation c
- minimal sub-configuration of unobserved values
$\overline{\mathrm{e}} \in \Omega(\boldsymbol{E})$ that in combination with the remaining evidence for $\boldsymbol{E} \backslash \boldsymbol{C}$ suffices to conclude $t^{\prime}$
" $t^{\prime}$ would result if the evidence contains c instead "


## Computing Explanations

- \# of potential sufficient explanations: $2^{|E|}$
- \# of potential counterfactual explanations: $\prod_{k=1}^{|E|}\left|\Omega\left(E_{k}\right)\right|-1$
- we need to compute the outcome for the associated value-assignments from the network
- in Bayesian networks, probabilistic inference is NP-hard....

Various properties of these explanations allow for their computation

- using a breadth first search: BFS-SFX-CFX
- on a dynamically annotated subset lattice


## Explanation lattice I

Lattice $\mathcal{L}=(\mathcal{P}(\boldsymbol{E}), \subseteq)$ and each element $\boldsymbol{S} \subseteq \boldsymbol{E}$ annotated with:

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\text { (1) } \mathrm{s} \subseteq \mathrm{e} & \\
\text { e.g. } & \mathrm{x}_{1} \mathrm{y}_{1} \mathrm{z}_{1} & \text { for } \boldsymbol{S}=\{X, Y, Z\} \\
& \mathrm{x}_{1} \mathrm{z}_{1} & \text { for } \boldsymbol{S}=\{X, Z\} \\
& \mathrm{y}_{1} & \text { for } \boldsymbol{S}=\{Y\}
\end{array}
$$

s is potentially a sufficient explanation; (s should be as small as possible)


## Explanation lattice II

Lattice $\mathcal{L}=(\mathcal{P}(\boldsymbol{E}), \subseteq)$ and each element $\boldsymbol{S} \subseteq \boldsymbol{E}$ annotated with:

2 all pairs (c, $\left.t^{*}\right)$ with $\mathbf{c} \in \Omega(\boldsymbol{E} \backslash \boldsymbol{S})$, $\mathbf{c} \subseteq \overline{\mathrm{e}}$, and $t^{*}$ is output for input sc

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { e.g. }\left(\mathrm{z}_{2}, t^{\prime}\right),\left(\mathrm{z}_{3}, t\right) \text { for } \boldsymbol{S}=\{X, Y\} \\
& \left(\mathrm{x}_{2}, t^{\prime \prime}\right) \quad \text { for } S=\{Y, Z\} \\
& \text { ( } \left.\mathrm{x}_{2} \mathrm{y}_{2}, \mathrm{unkn}\right) \text { for } S=\{Z\}
\end{aligned}
$$

c is potentially a counterfactual explanation;
 (c should be as small as possible)

## Explanation lattice III

Lattice $\mathcal{L}=(\mathcal{P}(\boldsymbol{E}), \subseteq)$ and each element $\boldsymbol{S} \subseteq \boldsymbol{E}$ annotated with:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 3 \text { 3 } l_{S} \in\{\text { true, exp, oth }\} \\
& \text { - true: all } t^{*} \text { in }\left(\mathbf{c}, t^{*}\right) \text { are } t \\
& \quad \Rightarrow \text { cue for continuing SFX } \\
& \text { - exp: all } t^{*} \text { are } t^{\prime} \\
& \quad \Rightarrow \text { cue for stopping CFX } \\
& \text { - oth: } t^{*} \text { mix of } t, t^{\prime}, t^{\prime \prime}, \ldots \\
& \quad \Rightarrow \text { cue for SFX and CFX }
\end{aligned}
$$

Initially all labels $l_{S}$ are empty


## Example



CHILD network (Spiegelhalter et al., 1993) implemented in Samlam (UCLA, AR Group)

## Example: finding sufficient explanations



Sufficient explanation(s): $\left\{{ }^{\prime} H=\right.$ yes $\wedge X=$ oligaemic' $\}$

## Example: finding counterfactual explanations



Counterfactual explanations:
$\{‘ X=$ Plethoric', ' $X=$ Normal $\wedge H=$ no', ' $X=$ Grd_Glass
$\wedge H=$ no', ' $X=$ Asy $/$ Patchy $\wedge H=$ no $\wedge O=<5$ ' $\}$

## Explanation support: MAP-independence

Recall: MAP $h^{*}=\arg \max _{\boldsymbol{h}} P(\boldsymbol{H}=\boldsymbol{h} \mid \boldsymbol{E}=\boldsymbol{e})$.
$h^{*}$ is MAP-independent of subset $\boldsymbol{R}$ of intermediate variables, if for all $\boldsymbol{r} \in \Omega(\boldsymbol{R})$ :
(Kwisthout, 2021)

$$
\underset{h^{\prime} \in \Omega(\boldsymbol{H})}{\arg \max _{1}} \operatorname{Pr}\left(h^{\prime} \wedge \boldsymbol{r} \mid \mathbf{e}\right)=h^{*}
$$

If $\operatorname{argmax} h^{\prime} \neq h^{*}$ for some $r$ then

- $r$ provides for a counterfactual;
- that contrasts outputs $h^{*}$ and $h^{\prime}$.

Note that the explanation concerns the effects of possible future observations rather than current!

[^2]
## Interactive explanation

S Based on the given evidence, what is your expected value for Acccident?
U I expect a moderate accident.
Based on the given evidence, it is found that severe is the most likely value for Accident.
Do you prefer understandable or convincing explanations for this finding?
U I prefer understandable explanations.
S We found the following sufficient and counterfactual explanations:
sufficient $\longrightarrow 1$. If only Age $=$ adolescent, Experience $<3$, Model $=$ old was observed severe would always be the most probable value for Accident regardless of the values for the other evidence. If $\mathrm{Model}=$ normal was observed instead of the actual values and all other values would stay the same, moderate would be the most probable value for Accident
2. If only Mileage $=2000$, Experience $<3$, Model $=$ old was observed severe would always be the most probable value for Accident regardless of the values for the other evidence.
[+ same counterfactual]

S Do you want to see more explanations?
U No.
S On what observation is your expectation for a moderate accident based?
U On the observation that I have a cautious driving style.
You probable have the right expectations of how $E_{i}$ influences the target.
However, this influence was suppressed by the other observations.

## Take home message

- explanations are more than ever necessary
- not everything needs explanation

- need to involve and interact with user more
- need to know what is technically possible
- effective explanations are not always accurate


The information in this presentation has been compiled with the utmost care, but no rights can be derived from its contents.


[^0]:    Img: https://blog.global.fujitsu.com/fgb/2019-08-01/
    why-ai-got-the-answer-explainable-ai-showing-bases/

[^1]:    2021: A taxonomy of explainable Bayesian networks (I.P. Derks, A. de Waal)
    2022: Extending MAP-independence for Bayesian network explainability (E. Valero-Leal, P. Larrañaga, C. Bielza)

[^2]:    Explainable Al using MAP-independence (J. Kwisthout, ECSQARU 2021)
    Relevance for Robust Bayesian Network MAP-Explanations (S. Renooij, PGM 2022)

